Network. For purpose of attack, the attackers use the two malicious nodes connected with each other by a tunnel that is aimed at eavesdropping or damaging the data packet. Previous researches aiming at securing against the wormhole attacks were published, typical as detection algorithms based on round trip time or packet traversal time, or hop-count based analysis. They have the detection effectiveness is mitigated on the network topology with high mobility nodes, and depends on tunnel length. This article proposes a valid route testing mechanism (VRTM) and integration of VRTM into AODV protocol to make DWAODV which is able to detect and prevent the wormhole attacks. Using Network Simulator (NS2), we evaluate the security effectiveness of DWAODV protocol on random movement network topology at high speed. The simulation results show that our solution is capable of detecting successfully over 99% of invalid routes, and small dependence on tunnel length. In addition, in the normal network topology, the routing performance of DWAODV is approximately as AODV based on the metrics including the average length of each discovered routing path, packet delivery ratio, network throughput and routing load.
Routing services at the network layer is one of the goals of denial of service (DoS), in which a malicious node tries to occupy other nodes resources. Some attack types, such as Blackhole, Sinkhole, Grayhole, Flooding and Wormhole attacks are types of DoS [16] . The wormhole attack in Mobile Ad hoc Networks was described by authors in [10] . They have described several types of wormhole attacks based on the techniques tunnel to route the packets, such as: wormhole through the tunnel (called out-of-band channel -OB), wormhole using encapsulation, wormhole using packet relay, wormhole with high power transmission. Authors [10] described that the wormhole attacks using tunnel may be operated for two modes of attacks: Hidden Mode (HM) and Participation Mode (PM). In HM, malicious nodes are hidden from normal nodes, when receive packets and simply forwards them to each other without process packet, thus, they never appear in routing tables of neighbors. In contrast, PM malicious nodes are visible during the routing process because they processes packets as normal nodes. The malicious node appears in routing tables of neighbors and the hop-count (HC) value increases when control packets are routed. This attacks type can be performed simply with on-demand routing protocols, typically the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV [15] ) routing protocol, the purpose is to be eavesdropping. [18] Related works for detection the wormhole attacks have been published, such as WARP [18] , LBK [11] , TIK [7] , DelPHI [2] , MHA [9] , and TTHCA [10] , all will be summarized in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose the valid route testing mechanism using the distance and routing cost parameters to examine the validity of discovered routes, and integrating VRTM into route discovery algorithm of AODV protocol to create DWAODV protocol. Section 4 shows the evaluation and analysis result using NS2, comparing related works and our approach results is also described in this section. Finally, conclusions and future works.
RELATED WORKS
The first, authors [18] described the WARP protocol using multi paths discovery (MPD) solution, and selection of the greater path which helps the source node "avoid" the route containing malicious nodes. The weakness of WARP is that it cannot work well in the normal topology due to the discovered route has not the best cost. The selection of route without best cost does not mean that route shall not contain the malicious nodes. The second, authors [11] described a graph theoretic model to characterize the wormhole attack and prevent wormholes. They used a local broadcast key (LBK) to install a secure Adhoc Network against wormhole attacks. There are two types of nodes used: guards and regular nodes. Guards nodes continuously broadcast location data containing the location information through global positioning system (GPS) or some other localization method like SeRLoc [12] . Regular nodes calculate their location relative to the guards' beacons, thus they can detect abnormal transmission due to data resent by the wormhole attackers. All transmissions between node pairs are encrypted by the local broadcast key of the sending end and decrypted at the receiving end. This approach is suitable for to the network with immobilized topology such as wireless sensor networks. If topology has fast mobilized nodes then this solution increases very large time delay and communication overhead based on guards nodes continuously broadcast location data. The next, authors [7] propose TIK protocol that can determine the wormhole attack. TIK uses packet leashes solution involving appending information to a packet relating to either distance or time, to limit packet's admissible transmission distance. Thus, the wormhole attack is detected because it passes packets more faster than valid routes. TIK depends on precisely synchronized time between all nodes, thus, the detection effectiveness is mitigated on the high speed mobilized nodes topology. Furthermore, authors [2] described an advanced AODV solution allowing detecting the wormhole attacks namely DelPHI. The idea is that the source node receives the reply routes packet on many routes and calculates the delay of control packets through each node. The delay time from the source node to destination node when a wormhole appears is longer much than that of the normal route at the same cost, therefore, the node can detect the attack. However, in the mobile topology at high speed, because the delay time of control packet is influenced, the detection ability to malicious nodes is restricted. Furthermore, authors [9] described MHA solution is a HC-based approach that does not require round trip time (RTT) measurement. MHA modifies the AODV route discovery protocol to identify several unique routes between the source and destination nodes. A route with a much lower HC value than other routes is then assumed to include a wormhole and is avoided in network communications. Finally, authors [10] presented a new robust wormhole detection algorithm based on packet traversal time and hop count analysis (TTHCA) for the AODV routing protocol. TTHCA provides wormhole detection performance with low mistake rates, without incurring either significant computational or network cost. However, the TTHCA detection ability to malicious nodes is restricted because the packet traversal time (PTT) is influenced in the mobile topology at high speed.
In addition, some solutions apply mechanism of authentication, integrity, non-repudiation based on digital signature, such as SAODV [13] , ARAN [17] . SAODV protocol only supports certification from end-to-end (EtE) without hop-by-hop (HbH), and ARAN is certified from HbH and EtE. They have high security, prevent wormhole Participation Mode, but they are failed by wormhole attacks in Hide Mode [8] , and the very large cost for discovery route is also disadvantages.
PROPOSING DWAODV PROTOCOL FOR SECURITY
This section describes the valid routes testing mechanism and integrating it into route discovery algorithm of AODV protocol to create a new improved protocol named DWAODV.
Valid route testing mechanism (VRTM)
Based on the characteristics of wormhole attacks it uses a private tunnel connected between two malicious nodes. Source nodes transfer route control packets on private tunnel that appears the discovered routes with a lower cost than actual routes. Our solution to define a route is valid or invalid based on distance between source and destination nodes using node location and routing cost. In order to make the parameter to check a valid route of VRTM, this article uses two definitions: Actual neighboring nodes and Valid routes. 
, where, R δ is maximum transmission radius of δ node, d(N i , N j ) is Euclidean distance between N i and N j nodes, according to formula (1), triplet (x δ , y δ , z δ ) is node δ location in coordinate system for a three-dimensional space.
(1) Example 1. In network topology in Figure 1 (a), N 1 and N 2 are actual neighbors because distance between N 1 and N 2 nodes is less than (or equal to) transmission radius of two nodes. It is assumed that source code N 1 discovers route to destination N n on direction
This route is deemed as valid if with any two nodes N i and N i+1 , they must be the actual neighbors.
Example 2. Routes in network topology ( Figure 1(b) ) is valid route because with any two nodes N i and N i+1 , they are actual neighbors.
The parameter to check a valid route
If it is hypothesized that a valid route from source node (N 1 ) to destination node (N n ), then from Definition 2, we have
Because two nodes N i and N j are actual neighboring nodes, based on Definition 1 we have
From (2) and (3), we have
Because all nodes are the same communication standard, then we have
From (4) and (5), we have
From (5) and (6), where R is node's maximum transmission radius, we have
Hence, the valid route is the route that two nodes (N i , N i+1 ) are actual neighboring nodes and the ratio of the lengths between source node (N 1 ) and destination node (N n ) to the routing cost must be less than (or equal to) the transmission radius of node.
VRTM contents
The valid route testing mechanism is shown in Figure 2 , the source node (N S ) initiates packet (P ), at the same time, records the location into GPS field before sending to the destination node (N D ). Intermediate nodes (N i ) checks the route which routed P packet, if (th R) and (d R) then the P packet arrived on valid route, else the P packet arrived on invalid route. Checking is repeated at all intermediate nodes until N D receives the P packet. In MANET, node location is not installed manually due to all random mobility nodes. Our idea is to use GPS information to define nodes location similarly to authors in [3] [14] . In case there exists any node without GPS signal, our solution can not detect and prevent the wormhole attacks. Hence, this node does not cooperate with the discover route processing until GPS signal is ready.
Improved DWAODV routing protocol
The Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV [15] ) uses the route exploration mechanism if it is necessary. If source node N S has no route to destination node N D then source node starts route discovery process by broadcasting the route request packets (RREQ) and receiving the route reply packets (RREP) from destination node. AODV protocol belongs to routing group based on distance vector, the routing cost is therefore calculated based on nodes from source N S to destination N D , this is hop count (HC) value in RREQ request packet and RREP reply packet, HC value increases by 1 when packet is routed by nodes. Destination node sends unicast RREP packet to reply a route when it receives RREQ packet, or the intermediate nodes can reply RREP if there exists any "fresh" enough route to destination node N D . Each node keeps sequence number (SN) value to determine "freshness" of recently explored route. Based on HC value and destination sequence number (DSN), source node N S updates new route that newly explored route is "fresh" enough and cheapest to destination. 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The DWAODV protocol is proposed by integration of VRTM into AODV protocol at the two phases: Broadcasting route request packet and unicasting route reply packet. The structure of SecRREQ and SecRREP packets of DWAODV as Figure 3 (a) and Figure 3(b) , improved from RREQ and RREP packets of AODV. They are supplemented two new fields named GPS and Path length, both of them are installed with 8 byte size for GPS field and 4 byte size for Path length field. The GPS field to record the geological location of node which sent (or forward) the packet, and the Path length field to save the lengths of the path delivering the packet.
Broadcasting route request packet in DWAODV
The Figure 4 describes the algorithm of route request packet broadcasting of DWAODV protocol. To discover a new route to destination node N D , the source node N S initiates the SecRREQ packet, and records the location into GPS field before broadcasting to all its neighbor nodes. • If N i had received the SecRREQ packet (using source address and broadcast id) then Drops SecRREQ and The end;
• N i inserts triple source address and broadcast id information into its Cache;
• N j is the last hop which routed SecRREQ packet. If N j is exists in Black List (BL) then the SecRREQ is dropped and The end;
• N i uses VRTM to check the valid route. If the SecRREQ arrives in the invalid route (th> R) or (d > R) then The SecRREQ packet is dropped; N i inserts N j into the its BL; All entries to N j are removed;
• Else,
-N i adds a reverse route to source node into its RT;
-If N i is the destination node or it has a fresh enough route to destination then N i sends the unicast SecRREP packet to reply a route for source through the N j next hop;
-Else, N i increases the HC value in SecRREQ, both GPS and Path length fields are updated, and broadcasts the SecRREQ packet for all its neighbors.
Example 3. See in Figure 5 (a), N 1 broadcasts the SecRREQ packet to destination node
Intermediate node (N 2 ) uses VRTM to check the valid route when it receives SecRREQ packet, N 2 routes SecRREQ to N 7 because of len( N 7 ) R, the route from N 1 to N 2 is valid. Checking the valid route is also performed at all other nodes including N 7 , N 9 , N 10 , N 11 and N 8 . The result is destination node N 8 accepts the SecRREQ packet and sends unicast SecRREP packet to reply source node because of (len(N 1 , N 8 )/6 R) and (d(N 11 , N 8 ) R), the route from N 1 to N 8 is valid.
(a) Normal network topology
(b) Wormhole attacks network topology Figure 6 shows the detail description of the processing to broadcast the SecRREQ packet using VRTM to check the valid route.
SecRREQ is acepted
SecRREQ is dropped Figure 6 . Description of the processing to broadcast the SecRREQ packet
Unicasting route reply packet in DWAODV
DWAODV uses the route reply algorithm is improved from route reply algorithm of AODV protocol as described in Figure 7 . A node generates a SecRREP packet if it is either the destination (N D ) or an intermediate (N i ) which has an "fresh" route to the destination. It saves the location into GPS field before unicasting SecRREP back to source node. When receives the SecRREP packet, the intermediate nodes N i processes it as follows:
• N j is the last hop which forwarded SecRREP packet;
• If N j is exists in BL then SecRREP is dropped and The end;
• N i uses VRTM to check the valid route. If the SecRREP packet arrives via invalid route (th> R) or (d > R) then the SecRREP packet is dropped; N i inserts N j into the its BL; All of the entry information to N j is removed;
-N i adds a reverse route to destination node into its RT;
-If N i is source node then N i accepts SecRREP packet to install a new route;
-Else, N i increases the HC value in SecRREP, both GPS and Length fields are updated before unicasting the SecRREP back to source node if it a entry is found; reversely, SecRREP is dropped. N 11 ) R, the route from N 8 to N 11 is valid. Similarly, node N 10 also forwards the SecRREP packet to N 9 because of (len(N 8 , N 10 )/2 R) and (d(N 10 , N 11 ) R), the route from N 8 to N 10 is valid. Checking valid route is also performed at N 9 , N 7 , N 2 and N 1 . The result is N 1 accepts the SecRREP packet because of (len(N 8 , N 1 )/6 R) and (d (N 1 , N 2 ) R), the route between N 8 and N 1 is valid.
However, in the network topology with wormhole attacks at Figure 5 
SecRREP is acepted Figure 8(b) shows the detailed description of the processing to unicast SecRREP using VRTM to check the valid route.
EVALUATE THE RESULT OF SIMULATION
This section presents the result of assessment on damage caused by wormhole attacks in the AODV protocol, the efficiency of DWAODV protocol based on the simulation on NS2 [4] . The source code for wormhole attacks on MANET is shared by the authors [1] at https://web.njit.edu. Source code DWAODV protocol which is upgraded from the source code of AODV protocol available on NS2 at the folder root/ns-allinone-2.35/ns-2.35.
Simulation parameters
We evaluate the security efficiency of our solution on simulation software NS2 (version 2.35). Similar parameters to those in [10] are used, the network topology is available with 300 normal nodes and 2 malicious nodes, and our simulation network operated in the area of 2000m × 2000m (4mil m 2 ), mobility nodes under Random Way Point (RWP [19] ), created by ./setdest tool. Malicious nodes are located at the center with n hops length tunnel (n = 3, 4, 5, and 6), and wormhole attacks behavior started eavesdropping at second 0; Simulation protocols are AODV and DWAODV, 600 seconds simulation times; the maximum radio range of node (R) is 250m, FIFO queue, 10 UDP connection, CBR traffic type, packet capacity of 512bytes, the first data source is started at second 0, the following data source is 5 seconds apart from each node; the detail of simulation parameters is listed in the following Table 1 . To evaluate the impact of wormhole attack and efficiency of DWAODV protocol to detect attacks, we use some evaluation metrics such as: The ratio of invalid route (IR) is detected, the ratio of packets are routed (RPR) by malicious node, the average length of each discovered routing path (ALR). The packet delivery ratio (PDR), PDR = (the number of packets delivered successfully / the total number of packets from source) × 100. Network throughput (NT) is amount of data transferred from source to destination in a given amount of time (1 second), NT = (Total number of successfully delivered packets × Packet size) / Simulation times. Routing load (RL [17] ) is the total of control packet overhead to deliver a data packet to destination node successfully, RL = the total number of control packets overhead / the total number of the received data packets.
Simulation results
After performing 600s for simulation of AODV and DWAODV protocols in the attacked and normal network topology. The simulation results is shown in the Figures 9 and 10. 
Detection efficiency for wormhole attacks
The simulation results in Figure 9 (a) shows that our approach has the successful detection ratio of IR over 99% for all scenarios. For TTHCA, Figure 9 (b) shows this ratio is fallen to below 99% due to the wormhole attacks PM mode having short tunnel (< 6 hops) which makes the wormhole routes particularly difficult to discern from a healthy route (see more in authors [10] , Figure 7 ). Thus, we may confirm that VRTM outperformed TTHCA for all wormhole lengths less than 6 hops with PM mode. Figure 9 (c) shows that malicious node attacked AODV routing protocol successfully, hence, there are more than 50% data packets are routed to destination nodes through malicious nodes. For similar scenarios, VRTM has very good detection efficiency for wormhole attacks, hence, there are lower than 0.1% data packets are routed by malicious node. Figure 10 (a)).
Comparing DWAODV and AODV in normal network topology
Figure 10(a) shows that DWAODV protocol discovers the routes which has the cost approximately AODV in the mobile topology at high speed. DWAODV protocol has the average cost for each route as 4.939 hops that is 0.018 larger than AODV (4.921 hops). Figure 10 (b) shows that PDR of DWAODV protocol is 78.857% that is 0.294% lower than AODV's (79.152%). PDR of DWAODV is less than to AODV in normal network topology due to two reasons: (1) Security solution limited discover route effective of DWAODV protocol (2) The average cost for each route discovered of DWAODV protocol is larger than AODV's, therefore, the time to route data packets to destination node shall be larger. Figure 10 (c) shows that the network throughput of DWAODV is 31,088.64 bps, 116.05 bps higher than AODV's (31,204.69 bps) due to the PDR of DWAODV protocol is lower than 
Comparing related works and our approach
We compare our approach with previous works in Table 2 . TIK, DelPHI and TTHCA algorithms to detect malicious nodes depending on round trip time or packet traversal time, hence detection ability is influenced largely by mobility speed and tunnel length. In contrast, our solution performance is affected slightly by mobility speed and tunnel length because of the VRTM using the distance and routing cost to detect the wormhole attack without round trip time or packet traversal time. For LBK solution, nodes continuously broadcast location data is the location information using the GPS information, all transmissions between node pairs is encrypted by the local broadcast key of the sending end and decrypted at the receiving end; and TIK solution depends on precisely synchronized time between all nodes, thus both solutions have high communication overhead (See in [9] , Table 3 ). Our solution uses low communication overhead because the processing to discover route is similar to that of the original protocol, and without new control packets. 
CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a valid route testing mechanism for routing security and a new improved protocol named DWAODV. Our solution uses the distance and hop count metrics to detect wormhole attacks, thus it has proven to be effective with low measurement mistakes in the high mobility network topology under attacks. The simulation results show that our solution is capable of detecting successfully over 99% of invalid routes, and small dependence on tunnel length. In addition, in the normal network topology, the routing performance of DWAODV is approximately AODV based on the metrics including the average length of each discovered routing path, packet delivery ratio, network throughput and routing load. However, packet deliver ratio of DWAODV is less than that of AODV in normal network topology because it is designed to work in unsafe network topology. Addition, VRTM requires all mobile nodes with GPS modules ready and maybe mistake is appears if GPS signals are poor or inaccurate.
In the future, important problem for the VRTM algorithm is to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the control packet. It is feasible that a PM mode wormhole node can deliberately give fake information concerning GPS and Path length fields.
